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INTRODUCTION 
 Climate change tests the limits of human understanding of complexity and 
uncertainty.  It challenges assumptions about our presumed power of control over this 
planet.  In an intellectual vacuum, climate change is a fascinatingly intricate and beautiful 
puzzle of ever-moving parts, and if nothing were at stake, its contemplation would be the 
perfect way to while away a pleasant lifetime, posing idly phrased “what ifs.”  As it is, of 
course, it is a genuine crisis that demands rigorous cross-disciplinary attention.  We draw 
on sociology, history, economics, biology, ecology, politics, and countless other 
disciplines to try to wrap our heads around the problem’s full magnitude.  One important 
angle of the endeavor, and the one discussed here, is the policy effort to regulate the 
causes of climate change, particularly as made by governmental agencies. 
 Executive branch bureaucracies, federal, state, and local alike, are the oft-
maligned or else simply overlooked agents of a substantial portion of the nation’s climate 
change regulations.  The role they play is vital.  Yet, at a guess, very few bright-eyed 
elementary school students have ever proclaimed, “I want to be a bureaucrat when I grow 
up.”  The connotations of acting by rote, carrying out orders from on high, giving the 
little gray cells very little to do behind a gray desk in a gray cubicle are unattractive.  
Happily, reality is less grim than this tableau framed in red tape would suggest.  
Bureaucrats are “active participants in the policymaking process,” endowed with 
substantial administrative discretion1
                                                 
1 Lindblom, Charles and Edward J. Woodhouse.  The Policy-Making Process.  3rd ed.  Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993.  Print.  59, 61 
 and tasked with the important and creative work of 
“taking the lofty aspirations of political leaders and translating them into concrete 
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proposals”2.  Policy-making “rests overwhelmingly in the hands of the bureaucracy.”3  It 
is to the individuals working in decision-making agencies that we citizens assign 
responsibility for making the necessary, fine-tuned tradeoffs that come with living in a 
world with infinite demand on finite resources, for deciding the “level of acceptable 
risk”4
 Like many citizens, I want to know what these individuals working for relevant 
governmental agencies are doing to decide the level of climate change risk that society 
will accept.  I am personally incentivized, not only out of academic or a citizen’s interest, 
but as a budding bureaucrat: I find myself in the position of hoping to one day be a 
decision-maker in a governmental agency dealing with climate change regulation.  To 
this end, the first of two broad intellectual goals of this thesis is to grasp the positive, 
descriptive theory on how agency employees might make decisions on complex topics, 
particularly climate change regulation.  Chapter 1 explores theories of rational, optimal 
decision-making.  Chapter 2 discusses the crowned king of decision-making 
methodologies, the rational ruler of the risk assessment realm, cost-benefit analysis.  
Chapter 3 establishes a challenger, the precautionary principle. 
 society must face.  It is up to them to take potentially vague, ambiguous legislative 
language and bring it down to earth, drafting feasible policies and practical programs that 
will satisfy intended social goals.  The pressure to make policy choices that will 
effectively address policy problems and that will be well-received with the public and 
other constituents is immense. 
                                                 
2 Peters, B. Guy.  American Public Policy: Promise & Performance.  8th ed.  Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2010.  Print.  80 
3 Lindblom 1993 59, 57 
4 Christoforou, Theofanis.  “The Precautionary Principle, Risk Assessment, and the Comparative Role of 
Science in the European Community and the US Legal Systems.”  Green Giants?: Environmental Policies 
of the United States and the European Union.  Eds. Norman J. Vig and Michael G. Faure.  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004.  17-51.  Print.  36 
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 The second goal of this document has a more forward-looking orientation.  In line 
with my ambition to one day work in this field, I aim to craft a normative evaluation of 
the decision-making methods among which to choose when facing climate change.  
Chapter 4 is an analysis of rational decision-making, cost-benefit analysis, the 
precautionary principle, and the relationship between all three.  It poses and attempts to 
answer theoretical questions about the utility of each in the case of regulating causes of 
climate change.  Chapter 5 presents suggested guiding principles that emerge from this 
analysis, as well as as-yet-unanswered guiding questions for decision-makers on climate 
change to ask themselves repeatedly and reflectively about their work.  Viewed through 
one lens, this analysis is essentially personal, intended to comb out intellectual tangles 
picked up over the last few years and to prime my career path by beginning to build a 
bridge from theory to practice.  I hope, however, that the analysis can be usefully read by 
others as well.  The wider audience in mind includes those individuals (already somewhat 
versed in the terminology of public policy analysis) who are willing to reflect on the 
theory in order to improve in practice, variously adopting and rejecting normative 
theoretical pointers as seen fit.  It should also be noted as a final obvious and gratuitous 
reminder to the reader that any conclusions reached or principles established are those of 
a student who has not herself been in an agency decision-making position.  
Recommendations for practice are proffered on the basis of read and learned theory, are 
hortatory rather than presumptuously jussive, and are unavoidably under-informed by 
personal experience. 
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CHAPTER 1: RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
 Let us start with a common and pleasing assumption: human beings are rational.  
“Virtually all of modern economics and large parts of the rest of social science… 
embrace the idea that human action is the result of human choice and that human choice 
is intendedly rational.”5  We suppose that we have knowledge of alternatives, 
consequences, consistent values by which we evaluate them, and decision-making rules.6  
We might go so far as to believe that we know “the probability distribution of 
consequences conditional on each alternative, and the subjective value of each possible 
consequence.”7  As rational, economic beings, we then select “the alternative with the 
highest expected value.”8
 To enable this rational thinking, we employ decision-making models, on the 
theory that “the process of making policy plays a significant part in determining the 
outcome.”
 
9  A structured approach is useful for reminding us of “important tasks and 
choices that otherwise might slip [our] mind.”10  An approach known as “the stages 
model” is the most “conventional process model of policy-making”: it “begins with 
agenda setting or problem definition; then proceeds through a series of steps such as 
program design, legitimation, budgeting, and evaluation.”11
                                                 
5 March, James G.  “Understanding how decisions happen in organizations.”  Organizational Decision 
Making.  Zur Shapira, ed.  United States of America: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  9-32.  Print.  10 
  A more detailed conception 
could be to define the policy problem; assemble evidence relevant to the case; construct 
possible policy alternatives; select criteria for judging between these alternatives; project 
6 Ibid. 10-11 
7 Ibid. 11 
8 Ibid. 11 
9 Peters 45 
10 Bardach, Eugene.  A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem 
Solving.  3rd ed.  Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009.  Print.  xvii 
11 Peters 46 
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outcomes of each alternative; confront the tradeoffs each policy would present; and then 
finally decide which policy alternative to adapt.12  In practice, “the order may be less 
linear… than it appears in the model,” but nevertheless, the stages model is a “useful 
heuristic device for mapping the route that policies take from being just a good idea to 
being a functioning program.”13
 We attempt to go about decision-making in as logical a fashion as possible.  The 
process of conducting organized policy analysis is “a pragmatic and responsible effort to 
facilitate reasonable discourse about a policy future that is inherently uncertain,” a 
method of helping define “common ground… by the rules and conventions of rational 
discourse.”
 
14  The conventional model of reasoned decision-making may enable 
“analytical procedures to resolve disagreements,” and through a formalized decision-
making process, stakeholders with opposing views “may discover that at least some 
seemingly irreducible values conflicts can be recast as dry-as-dust technical 
disagreements.”15
 Decision-makers operating in a traditional framework characterized by “economic 
and utilitarian values” will “assum[e] that policies are best understood in terms of 
improving the economic well-being of those affected by them.”
  An open-season, less structured policy-making approach would be less 
likely to facilitate this result. 
16
                                                 
12 Bardach 
  Seen through this 
economic lens, the goal of linear policy-making models is to “define optimal policy 
outcomes and to design institutional arrangements that may be capable of producing 
13 Peters 47, 48 
14 Bardach 24, xix 
15 Ibid. xix 
16 Peters 59 
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those desirable outcomes.”17  These “optimal” policies envisioned as the logical, natural 
end product or output of the linear decision-making models may, however, be decidedly 
unachievable in the “real world of politics.”18
 
  We have traditionally embraced models of 
policy-making founded on impossible ideals that do not in reality exist.  If we are to 
understand how decisions are made in the non-ideal world, we should be aware of the 
factors that constrain decision-makers. 
Limits on Rational Decision-Making 
 Modern theorists have pointed out that the assumption that humans are perfectly 
rational is merely a wave of an economist’s hand: perfect models behave well, but they 
are unlikely to reflect the world accurately.  Real-life decision-making “is bounded by 
significant individual and organizational constraints on finding and implementing an 
optimal solution.”19  We cannot presume “omniscient rationality” in human beings, since 
we are faced with “limitations of computational capability, [and] the organization and 
utilization” of the mind.20  The “uncertainty and disagreement” that will arise because of 
these limitations “are fundamental facts… that cannot be wished away even by the most 
rigorous analysis.”21
                                                 
17 Ibid. 57 
  This is especially true in the case of climate change, when 
uncertainty pervades not only the policymaking sphere but the scientific as well: the all-
important technical details are hotly contested, and no perfectly certain policy can be 
written around irreducibly uncertain scientific evidence. 
18 Ibid. 57 
19 March 1997 11 
20 March 1986 146 
21 Lindblom 1993 vii 
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 To explain the gap between “the perfect human rationality that is assumed in 
classical and neoclassical economic theory and the reality of human behavi[o]r as it is 
observed in economic life,” theorists developed the term “bounded rationality.”22  The 
concept originated out of “dissatisfaction with the models that adhere to the ‘perfect 
rational man’ paradigm.”23  Bounded rationality points to “the extreme difficulty of 
making fully rational decisions and argue[s] that rationality can best be seen as bounded 
by organizational, political, and cultural parameters,”24 including excessive agency focus 
on budget, staking out policy turf, rigid adherence to process above achievement of 
socially desirable results, and perceived obligation to special interest groups25
 One theorist cautions that unless these “limits are taken very seriously, it is 
impossible to appreciate the magnitude of the task facing the political system; and unless 
political action is adjusted to take account of the fact that complex problems cannot be 
understood fully, policy making will fare much worse than it needs to.”
.  Add to all 
this the limitations intrinsic within humans, and we are at quite a distance from a fully 
rational man. 
26  Another adds, 
even more forcefully, that we should recognize that “we would reach different 
conclusions in our economic analyses if we substituted the concept of bounded rationality 
for the concept of global optimization.”27
                                                 
22 Simon, Herbert.  With Massimo Egidi, Robin Marris and Riccardo Viale.  Economics, Bounded 
Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution.  Massimo Egidi and Robin Marris, eds.  Worcester, Great 
Britain: Billing and Sons Ltd., 1992.  Print.  3 
  The expectation of perfect rationality 
throughout the decision-making process, particularly for the complex problem of climate 
23 Rubinstein, Ariel.  Modeling Bounded Rationality.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998.  
Print.  2 
24 Peters 54-55 
25 Lindblom 1993 64 
26 Ibid. 5-6 
27 Simon 3 
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change regulation, is “impossible and perhaps even unwise”28.  To assume perfect 
rationality is to dismiss a richer, more complex, and hence more accurate view of 
reality.29
 Classical policymaking models are driven by the desire to create the optimal 
policy.  But some theorists point out that since our rationality is internally flawed and 
externally constrained, fatalistically but realistically we should not expect to optimize.  
“Even when extended by a range of devices from written language to… computers, the 
mind at its best simply cannot grasp the complexity of social reality,” and even “the very 
best professional analysis never rises to infallibility.”
 
30  Another argues that, instead of 
optimizing, decision-makers instead engage in “satisficing,” a term coined as “a short-
hand label” for decision-makers’ “develop[ing] decision procedures that are sensible, 
given the constraints.”31  This “adaptiveness falls far short of the ideal of ‘maximizing’ 
postulated in economic theory.  [We] adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; [we] do not, in 
general, ‘optimize.’”32
[o]n superficial examination,… are often dismissed as irrational.  For they are 
seen as indecisiveness, patching up, timidity, triviality, narrowness of view, 
inconclusiveness, caution, and procrastination.  But we have seen them to be 
useful devices for structuring man’s analytic capacities.  Man has had to be 
devilishly inventive to cope with the staggering difficulties he faces.  His 
analytical methods cannot be restricted to tidy scholastic procedures.  The… 
satisficer may not look like [a] heroic figure.  He is nevertheless a shrewd, 
  These adaptive strategies, 
                                                 
28 Peters 54 
29 Ibid. 60, 57 
30 Lindblom 1993 5, 17 
31 March 1986 146 
32 Simon 39 
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resourceful problem-solver who is wrestling bravely with a universe that he is 
wise enough to know is too big for him.33
 Two of the analytical methodologies we have developed to try to grasp our 
complex scientific and social surroundings are presented in the following two chapters.  
Each evinces an endorsement, to a greater or lesser extent, of either the perfectly rational 
man paradigm or the concept of bounded rationality, and the choice between them has 
implications for the decision-making process and ultimately the nature of the policies and 
programs developed.  With that in mind, we turn now to cost-benefit analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Lindblom 1968 27 
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CHAPTER 2: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 Apart from “intuition and experience,” cost-benefit analysis can be considered the 
“most commonly employed” decision-making tool.34  A decision-maker using cost-
benefit analysis, as the name implies, “reduce[s] all the costs and benefits of [a] proposed 
government program[] to a quantitative, economic dimension and then compare[s] 
available alternative policies using that standard.”35  In simplest terms, if a decision-
maker calculates that the benefits of the project outweigh the costs, then he will decide 
the project is a good idea, and will take action to implement it.  For public projects, 
governmental agency employees weigh social costs and benefits, seeking a program that 
will “produce a benefit for society greater than its cost.”36  This goal rests on “utilitarian, 
economic logic,” presuming that “total wealth is… of paramount importance” and that 
“the best policies are those that create the greatest net benefit for society.”37  To perform 
cost-benefit analysis, a decision-maker must “enumerate, and attach a monetary value 
to,” both positive and negative features of a policy alternative, using money as a “single 
measuring rod” to allow comparisons of discrete features.38  We can, in a sense, compare 
apples to oranges if we first “convert” apples into these abstract units of “dollars,” and do 
the same for oranges.  We also take the term “cost-benefit analysis,” in the strictest sense 
and as a starting point, to imply “the commensurability of all goods”39
                                                 
34 Peters 443 
: we presuppose 
that the cost-benefit analysis methodology has the power to measure and value all 
intangibles. 
35 Ibid. 87 
36 Ibid. 443 
37 Ibid. 443, 444 
38 Ibid. 444 
39 Sunstein, Cass.  Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment.  Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002.  Print.  123-124 
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Advantages of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 Policymakers are entrusted with public well-being and granted a slim margin of 
error.  Their decisions must be “right,” ideally without fail, and are not only high-stakes, 
but complex, requiring consideration of a near infinite number of factors.  Cost-benefit 
analysis is seen by many decision-makers as a tool to “overcome cognitive limitations” 
inherent in humans: often there are too many factors to consider at once without carefully 
assessing them.40  Cost-benefit analysis is meant to generate “a full… sense of what is at 
stake,” making possible “sensible priority-setting.”41  To its proponents, it is “a helpful 
input into the decision,” and “a pragmatic tool to guide analysis and to allow informed 
comparisons.”42  In other words, it is intended to be a highly rational approach to 
comprehensively consider all factors relevant to the decision.  It can be seen as an 
essential corrective to the pitfalls of human fallibility: we need a structured, rational 
approach to compensate for our individual capacity failings.  Whereas intuitive, “ordinary 
thinking goes wrong” and is “unreliable,” cost-benefit analysis is “a means of 
overcoming predictable problems in individual and social cognition” by “putting ‘on 
screen’ important social facts that might otherwise escape private and public attention.”43
 Cost-benefit analysis has the added plus of generating numbers, which can have 
palliative effect on agitated stakeholders, giving the impression of inarguable bottom-line 
  
For a dizzyingly complex policy problem like climate change, employing a tool that 
attempts to systematically account for all potential benefits and costs in due course 
sounds hugely helpful. 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 107 
41 Ibid. 107 
42 Ibid. 292, 111 
43 Ibid. 29 
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certainty.  If the numbers show that costs outweigh benefits, then they effectively 
mandate the abortion of the policy or program.  Apolitical numbers that seemingly write 
their own policy implementation plans automatically are a decision-maker’s dream 
answer to critiques that there is “a high level of arbitrariness in modern regulation,”44
 
 and 
the appearance of neutrality and inevitability is unquestionably politically advantageous 
in contentious policy debates. 
Complications of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 The reader may have noticed a pattern in the above descriptions of cost-benefit 
analysis, namely that the impregnability of the method’s conclusions is repeatedly 
qualified.  Numbers do not give certainty—they give the illusion of certainty.  Costs and 
benefits are not self-evident—they are seemingly so.  Results are not neutral—they are 
apparently apolitical.  Cost-benefit analysis, as with any other tool employed by human 
hand or human mind, is not devoid of human judgment.  Therefore it is not devoid of 
human fallibility and error.  Critics of cost-benefit analysis point out that “values are in 
action throughout the policy process,”45 and that cost-benefit analysis is no exception.  
During the valuation and monetization process, decision-makers must “adopt a number of 
assumptions and approximations to reach a decision…. [T]hat answer should not remain 
unquestioned.”46
                                                 
44 Sunstein, Cass.  Worst-Case Scenarios.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007.  
Print.  205 
  Cost-benefit analysis has been notoriously called “nonsense on stilts,” 
“impl[ying] that there are so many assumptions involved in the calculations, and so many 
imponderables about the future effect of projects, that cost-benefit analysis is the 
45 Peters 459 
46 Ibid. 455 
Carr 15 - 41 
functional equivalent of witchcraft in the public sector.”47  In performing formal cost-
benefit analysis, “regulators must make difficult and often speculative judgments about 
the likely effects of alternative regulatory strategies”; they add another layer of 
assumption when they “turn those effects into monetary equivalents.”48
 A decision-maker may assert that he has enumerated “all costs and benefits,” but 
“all” to him may not be “all” to another.  Decision-makers have individual opinions about 
what factors deserve to be valued, what constitutes a cost and a benefit, and finally the 
magnitude, translated approximately into dollars, of the cost or benefit.  Market forces, 
usually relied upon to correctly assign value to tangibles and intangibles, “may not 
reflect… costs and benefits fully,” leaving some externalized.
  If we follow the 
perfectly rational man paradigm, then this is unproblematic—we can believe that each 
calculation is rational.  If, however, we doubt the limitless extent of human rationality, 
then each holds the potential for dangerous missteps. 
49  If cost-benefit analysis 
“is used naïvely and uncritically” by a decision-maker who “let[s] the method make 
decisions for them,” then “the result can be decisions that many people would deem 
socially undesirable.”50  Cost-benefit analysis is based on the principle of the utilitarian 
maximization of social wealth.  Utilitarian norms are “important bases for evaluating a 
program, but they may not be the only relevant criteria.”51
                                                 
47 Ibid. 457 
  But it would be “controversial 
and implausible” indeed to assert that “all regulatory decisions should be made by 
aggregating private willingness to pay, as if economic efficiency is or should be the goal 
48 Sunstein 2007 199-200 
49 Peters 448 
50 Ibid. 456 
51 Peters 473 
Carr 16 - 41 
of all regulation.”52
 The definitional bounds of the term “cost-benefit analysis” are unclear and may 
be drawn narrowly to mean exclusively quantitative analysis, or may stretch to include 
qualitative description as well.  It is difficult to imagine that any decision-makers employ 
cost-benefit analysis in its purest, most simply utilitarian form.  More open-eyed 
practitioners will recognize that “dollar numbers cannot substitute for a fuller inquiry,” 
and that quantitative results should not stand alone, but “should supplement rather than 
displace qualitative description of relevant effects.”
  While cost-benefit analysis provides valuable information about a 
policy’s economic desirability, it is silent on other vital dimensions, including the 
distribution of those costs and benefits, justice, and ethics, all at play in the case of 
climate change.  Cost-benefit analysis does not provide guidance towards an answer 
when decision-makers ask to whom the benefits of a policy will accrue, who will bear the 
costs, and whether or not this is a morally acceptable outcome for society. 
53  Some go so far as to recommend 
that these qualitative effects should be considered a strong enough basis for an agency “to 
make adjustments in the analysis.”54
 
  There is reason to believe that exclusively 
quantitative analysis of costs and benefits is incomplete, unreliable, and socially 
undesirable. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Sunstein 2002 29 
53 Sunstein 2002 123, 111 
54 Ibid. 111 
Carr 17 - 41 
Taking a Step Towards Precaution 
 Time now for a hypothetical question: What is the monetized value of the human 
race?55  Luckily, this is a hypothetical question (although some have taken it as a 
challenge have determined an answer)56
 Non-expert evaluations of cost and benefit can be derided by professionals as 
misguided and overly reliant on emotional, intuitive responses.  But, of course, even 
expert “estimates of both costs and benefits often turn out to be wrong,” largely because 
the “[overwhelming] informational demand on agencies” is not matched with 
correspondingly extensive information.
.  But just for a moment, imagine it is not.  If a 
decision-maker were forced to reckon up, in US dollars, the value of the human race, or 
even the value of planet Earth, how might he go about it?  Probably he would have to 
make a few assumptions and judgment calls.  The point of this extreme example is to 
illustrate that we humans have difficulty rationally judging the value of intangibles, 
especially in aggregate and on a large scale.  Assumptions are unavoidable: they should 
not be covered up, but acknowledged and presented openly. 
57  Furthermore, while we may be able to reach 
relatively high levels of certainty about some low probability risks, there is a distinction 
between this and other forms of uncertainty which are irreducible,58
                                                 
55 Sunstein 2007 217 
 inherent within 
ecosystems and planetary systems, and that no amount of money or time invested will 
make knowable to the last degree.  Uncertainty is a defining feature of climate change, 
and must be factored into policy decisions about greenhouse gas emissions.  In cases such 
56 Apparently it is $600 trillion.  Sunstein, Cass.  “Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment.”  Ethics Jan. 
2005: 351–385.  Web.  3 Dec. 2012.  <http://www.masonlec.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/C-B-
Analysis-and-the-Environment.pdf>. 
57 Sunstein 2007 129-130 
58 Brown, Donald.  “The Precautionary Principle as a Guide to Environmental Impact Analysis: Lessons 
Learned from Global Warming.”  Tickner 141-156.  154 
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as these, governments are increasingly “concerned with… risks… and need to be able to 
link the probability of their occurring with their relative costs and benefits,”59
 Some theorists consider these challenges to be insurmountable, and inadequately 
addressed by the cost-benefit analysis methodology.  They dispute the commensurability 
of intangibles, and argue that a policy founded on valuations of costs and benefits does 
not accurately deal with uncertainty.  When faced with unknown risk, we ought to err on 
the side of precaution.  Variations on this stance are collected together under the term the 
“precautionary principle.” 
 but they 
face considerable obstacles in doing so. 
                                                 
59 Peters 456 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 As with cost-benefit analysis, there are definitional ambiguities concerning the 
precautionary principle.  One definition states that the principle “references the potential 
for harm to persons and the environment, scientific uncertainty about those harms, and 
taking anticipatory action.”60  It is meant to apply “in situations of environmental risk 
where by the time unambiguous scientific evidence of a serious problem becomes 
available, the danger may already have materialized and perhaps become irreversible.”61
 
  
Proponents of a precautionary approach question the bounds of human cognition and 
scientific knowledge, arguing that we should exercise precaution in those cases when we 
are at unknown or unknowable but presumably large risk. 
Historical Emergence of the Precautionary Principle 
 The precautionary principle has more direct historical relevance to environmental 
thought than does cost-benefit analysis, a more general public policy tool.  The late 1970s 
and early 1980s saw increasing “need to prevent environmental degradation, which was 
perceived to be growing rapidly.”62  The “overall scientific uncertainty” surrounding 
environmental damage that “could not be clearly attributed to a specific agent or source 
of contamination or pollution” meant that these environmental problems “could not be 
approached on the basis of the old principle that allowed intervention only in situations of 
full scientific knowledge and established causality.”63
                                                 
60 Whiteside, Kerry H.  Precautionary Politics: Principle and Practice in Confronting Environmental Risk.  
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006.  Print.  150 
  In the US, much of our landmark 
environmental legislation reflects this shifted attitude, “requir[ing] that action be taken to 
61 Ibid. viii 
62 Christoforou 22 
63 Ibid. 21 
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anticipate, prevent, or reduce risk where there is scientific uncertainty or a lack of clear 
evidence or risk.”64  The Endangered Species Act (1966), Clean Air Act (1970), the 
Clean Water Act (1972), and the chlorofluorocarbon ban (1978) all contain precautionary 
language in view of the scientific uncertainty surrounding the regulated substances.65
 Towards the end of this period, a pivotal US Supreme Court decision was handed 
down that halted this trend.  In view of the considerations listed above, regulatory 
agencies typically “regarded risk assessment as a highly judgmental and largely 
qualitative exercise,” and “resisted quantification.”
 
66  The 1980 “Benzene Decision” 
(Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute) marked a turning 
point, effectively establishing that agencies were legally required to perform quantitative 
risk assessment, relying on numbers and valuation and monetization techniques.  The 
Benzene Decision “provided a huge impetus for quantitative risk assessment” because it 
established that the “only language in which agencies could credibly balance regulatory 
costs against the health of workers and citizens or the value of ecosystems was the 
language of numbers.”67
 
  Just at the time of rising consciousness about immeasurably 
complex environmental problems, then, also came a shift away from the kind of 
qualitative assessment that may be best suited to tackling those problems. 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 19 
65 Ibid. 19 
66 Jasanoff, Sheila.  “A Living Legacy: The Precautionary Ideal in American Law.”  Tickner 227-240.  234-
235 
67 Ibid. 234-235 
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New Kinds of Risks, New Methods of Analysis 
 Some theorists are proponents of a methodology that recalls decision-making 
before the legal push towards quantification.  Our understanding of environmental 
degradation in the last forty years has matured considerably, perhaps in no way more 
importantly than in the recognition that we know so little in the face of hugely complex, 
global-scale problems.  Climate change, the foremost modern environmental crisis, is “so 
widespread and associated with such a long timescale” that it inherently “brings with it 
enormous uncertainties.”68  These extreme uncertainties arise “from both limitations in 
current scientific tools and the nature of complex systems.”69  They are new risks that 
manifest themselves on a “large scale and develop slowly, often with irreversible 
consequences,” and the “magnitude of potential dangers is unprecedentedly large.”70
 It would be comforting in the face of such alarming assertions if we knew our 
decision-makers—tasked with “selecting” social risk—were equipped with the best, most 
appropriate decision-making tools to confront these new perils.  But advocates of 
precaution insist that our current tools are inadequate, arguing that “[e]ffects on the scale 
of climate change… confound existing approaches of risk management” and that the 
“long-term delayed, global dangers… can exceed the ability of current strategies to 
contain them.”
 
71  In theory, this “particular category of new risks” is where the 
precautionary principle has the greatest relevance.72
                                                 
68 Woodward, Alistair.  “Uncertainty and Global Climate Change: The Case of Mosquitoes and Mosquito-
Borne Disease.”  Tickner 127-140.  127 
  Cost-benefit analysis is “complex, 
69 Tickner, Joel A.  “The Role of Environmental Science in Precautionary Decision-Making.”  Tickner 3-
10.  4-5 
70 Whiteside 30 
71 Ibid. 32, 30 
72 Ibid. 30 
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value laden, and contentious,”73 yet it is frequently assumed to provide neutral, simple, 
indisputable answers.  Critics of traditional cost-benefit analysis highlight the fact that 
attempts to value ecosystem intangibles “require the papering over of many uncertainties 
and using so many patently inadequate methods of cost calculation that the results are, at 
best, extremely controversial.  At worst, they are simply absurd, because many of these 
ecological services are irreplaceable.”74  Rather than trying to hide uncertainty and value 
judgments behind a numerical veneer, the precautionary principle proposes a more open 
relationship with uncertainty.  While it is standard “to demand scientifically verified 
evidence of a problem before regulating it,” in cases where “scientific consensus is… 
slow in coming, partial, contested, and fallible,” requiring “high levels of scientific proof 
before acting is… an irrational strategy”75
 There are two broad conceptions of how to best incorporate precaution into 
decision-making.  First, one view holds that “[w]e need the precautionary principle for 
special situations in which ordinary assumptions about risk management do not hold.”
 (emphasis in original).  Thus the 
precautionary principle would permit action before results are completely verifiable. 
76  
This language implies a threshold, below which uncertainty is able to be enfolded into 
traditional cost-benefit analysis or risk analysis methods, and above which the levels of 
uncertainty are extraordinary and require “a supplementary dose of precaution.”77
                                                 
73 Tickner, Joel A.. ed.  Precaution, Environmental Science, and Preventive Public Policy.  Washington: 
Island Press, 2003.  Print.  193 
  The 
precautionary principle is not necessarily tailored to apply to “situations where risks are 
74 Whiteside 31-32 
75 Ibid. 34, 146 
76 Ibid. 30 
77 Ibid. 30 
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relatively well understood”; instead, it is “precisely for cases of serious potential danger 
where risks are poorly understood.”78
 As an alternative to the notion of a threshold for precaution, the precautionary 
principle could be considered “an omnipresent decision-making screen through which all 
goals, potential alternative courses of action, and options for midcourse corrections are 
examined.”
 
79  Seen in this light, precaution “is not simply a process that is or is not 
triggered,” 80
 
 but a tool in continual use, across the spectrum of analysis, from 
quantitative to qualitative, in cases of certain and uncertain risk.  Any decision we make 
employing a precautionary approach—including cost-benefit calculations—we make 
consciously and respectfully in view of our limitations. 
Critiques of the Precautionary Principle 
 We recur again to definitional vagueness.  Just as “cost-benefit analysis” may 
expand or contract to include varying amounts of qualitative analysis, the “precautionary 
principle” can be interpreted literally or more broadly.  One academic draws special 
attention to the word “principle” in the term, stating, “It should be clarified that the 
United States does not deny that precautionary measures or a precautionary approach 
may be adopted to regulate risk.  What it is contesting is the existence or emergence of a 
precautionary principle that can trump or override provisions in existing agreements”81
                                                 
78 Ibid. 48-49 
 
(emphasis in original).  Another does not seem to ascribe so specific a meaning to the 
term, instead arguing that the precautionary principle, taken to mean a precautionary 
79 O’Brien, Mary.  “Science in the Service of Good: The Precautionary Principle and Positive Goals.”  
Tickner 279-296.  279 
80 Ibid. 279 
81 Christoforou 27 
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approach, is already integrated into traditional cost-benefit analysis-driven decision-
making processes: a comprehensive, “competent cost-benefit analysis… takes good 
account of the precautionary principle by asking regulators to attend to low-probability 
risks of significant harms.  [Cost-benefit analysis] subsumes this risk… into the overall 
assessment.”82
 There are also more strident objections to the idea of a precautionary principle.  
Some fear it will lead to “massive overregulation of private enterprise.”
  Advocates of cost-benefit analysis might insist that insufficiently 
precautious decisions are not the result of a fundamentally faulty cost-benefit model: 
rather, the analysis can be enhanced by incorporating precaution into calculations.  This 
statement reflects both a broad conception of the precautionary “principle” and a broad 
conception of cost-benefit analysis.  Middle-ground theorists seem to support a decision-
making technique based on both quantitative and qualitative assessment, in which 
precautionary thinking influences the valuation of costs and benefits.  A decision-maker 
placing a monetary value on an intangible benefit of climate change reduction, for 
example, could buffer his calculation, accounting cautiously for unknowable risk. 
83  Others worry 
that, “[t]aken literally, the precautionary principle would lead to indefensibly huge 
expenditures,” since, if “we take costly steps to address all risks, however improbable 
they are, we will quickly impoverish ourselves.”84  Some paint a caricature of the 
precautionary principle as stymieing any action at all: it can be seen as an alarming 
mandate that ‘“whatever it is you’re doing, you’ve got to stop,’”85
                                                 
82 Sunstein 2002 104 
  or as “literally 
paralyzing”: 
83 Whiteside 42 
84 Sunstein 2002 103 
85 Whiteside 29 
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[A] failure to regulate will run afoul of the precautionary principle because  
potential risks are involved.  But regulation itself will cause potential risks, and  
hence run afoul of the precautionary principle too; and the same is true for every  
step in between.  Hence the precautionary principle… bans every imaginable step,  
including inaction itself.86
 
 
Moving Forward: A New Method of Analysis 
 Precaution is often slandered as being the enemy of scientific inquiry, as founded 
on fear and an irrational doubt of the power of science to “know.”  Proponents of 
precaution do not dispute that scientific evidence “helps avoid… irrational outcomes.”87  
Perhaps they would not go so far as to wholeheartedly endorse a “positivist view of 
science,” holding that it is “a powerful and neutral tool capable of predicting risk and 
causality,”88 but nevertheless, far from rejecting the information it provides, precaution 
makes “a demand for better science”89.  Rigorous scientific inquiry has a vital role to play 
in precautionary decision-making, since precaution “implies research, experimentation, 
phased introduction, [and] traceable usage.”90  Fuller reporting could include “a more 
comprehensive quantitative and qualitative (descriptive) analysis and discussion of 
uncertainty” that would candidly disclose any unknowns and unknowables in the 
scientific process.91
                                                 
86 Sunstein 2002 103-104 
  It could discuss “sources of uncertainty…; the type of uncertainty…; 
the degree of uncertainty and certainty in conclusions; how much uncertainty can or 
87 Whiteside 44-45 
88 Christoforou 34-35 
89 Whiteside xi 
90 Ibid. 55-56 
91 Tickner 12 
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cannot be reduced through additional research; and the implications of uncertainty.”92  
Thus, a “commitment to precaution” as a decision-making metric could be seen as more 
honest, more open than analysis based predominantly on valuations of costs and benefits: 
a precautionary approach would not force scientists or decision-makers “to pretend that 
they can quantify, make commensurate, and maximize benefits when, in truth, the 
conditions for such operations are unavailable”93.  Precaution “has the advantage of 
bringing the elements of judgment out into the open and making them subject to debate, 
rather than burying them in methodologies understandable only by experts.”94
 Interestingly, academic proponents of cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary 
principle both make the case that their approach is the more progressive.  On one hand, 
cost-benefit analysis is a helpful tool because we can use it to make informed, rational 
decisions that rise above of cognitive errors.
  This 
transparency has the potential to enhance the democratic element of policy-making, but it 
may also be opposed by experts who are not eager to have to defend qualitative 
assumptions to a public more willing to accept numerically justifiable, quantitative 
conclusions. 
95  On the other hand, “[t]he emergence of 
the precautionary principle is a classic example of social learning in environmental 
affairs….  Societies, like individuals, are capable of evolving more sophisticated means 
of cognition….  Precaution is a corrective factor built into our societies’ means of 
environmental cognition.”96
                                                 
92 Ibid. 12 
  Precaution is already embedded in some of America’s most 
hallowed environmental laws, as mentioned previously.  It is also “a settled matter of 
93 Whiteside 57 
94 Ibid. 57 
95 Sunstein 2002 
96 Whiteside 146 
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international law,” specifically under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, which “include[s] a version of the precautionary principle as a 
mandatory guide to all nations that are parties to the UNFCCC.”97  The oxymoronic 
phrase “mandatory guide” aside, it is remarkable that such language made its way into 
the document at all.  Its inclusion marks a shift in human perception of our own 
capabilities.  After at least two centuries marked by both the rhetoric and industrial-scale 
evidence of human dominion over the earth, “[f]or the first time, progress consists in 
recognizing our inability to master the world”98
 Institutionalized precaution in political and regulatory structures naturally follows 
theoretical discourse: “creating new institutional structures that promote precaution” is an 
important step towards making precautionary decision-making habitual.
. 
99  But doing so 
has the potential of sapping the method’s strength, since institutionalized precaution 
would face disciplinary demands.  The pressure “to transform it into easily performable 
bureaucratic routines that can survive judicial review and meet citizens’ demands for 
objectivity [would] prove irresistible,” and the method might “lose the active engagement 
with the uncertain and the unfathomable, and the commitment to moral reflection.”100
 This rather defeatist viewpoint—that precaution must be embedded in decision-
making institutions if we are to be expected to consistently make acceptable policy 
decisions but that the very act of institutionalizing it might defeat the purpose—brings us 
to an evaluation of the potentials for operationalization of the two analytical methods of 
cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle. 
   
                                                 
97 Brown 142 
98 Whiteside xiii 
99 Jasanoff 237 
100 Ibid. 237 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 
 The object of this analysis is to synthesize the preceding theory of cost-benefit 
analysis and precaution, exploring what differentiates and what connects them, through 
considering the role of the decision-maker’s perception of human rationality in analyzing 
risk and uncertainty.  Running below the surface of this analysis are questions about the 
value of these theories to practitioners tackling complex problems like climate change in 
real life.  Do decision-makers know enough through intuition and experience that they 
needn’t rely on theory put forth by academics?  Should we concern ourselves with 
developing perfectly descriptive models in the theoretical realm, and should we make an 
effort to match practice to normative theories?  And if so, which ones?  In short, do the 
theories analyzed here amount to a kind of cohesive manifesto that should be paid any 
heed by practitioners?  Furthermore, we should consider the utility and relevance of these 
normative conclusions in the context of climate change regulation. 
 For now, I must believe that consideration of the theory—leading either to its 
ultimate adoption or dismissal—is valuable.  It is worth reiterating here that this 
document reflects the transitional stage of its author, versed in academic theory and 
poised to enter the real world of the practitioner.  From this vantage point, I can only 
analyze practice by pointing out theory; I cannot do the reverse and draw on experience 
and practice to critique theory.  This chapter imagines how future decisions might be 
formed.  Rhetorical questions that are unanswerable from my current standpoint (or 
perhaps from anyone’s) are reserved for the list of guiding questions in Chapter 5.  The 
experience needed to discern the actual limitations on operationalizing theory is currently 
missing, but hopefully yet to come. 
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Analysis of Cost-Benefit Analysis and Precaution 
 I disbelieve that optimal regulations can be achieved simply by following a linear, 
quantitative method of integrating the best available scientific evidence and accounting 
for costs and benefits.  Numbers are valuable insofar as they are the most able to stolidly 
rebuff challenges, including legal ones, to their validity.  It is true that they facilitate 
negotiation, an important advantage in a world with finite resources in which we must 
consider tradeoffs carefully.  Numbers can add to our store of knowledge, decreasing the 
amount of things that remain outside our comprehension.  But there will still be a gap in 
which uncertainty remains.  And even numbers that constitute our knowledge should be 
questioned.  Quantification of all relevant aspects—of intangible, incommensurable 
social costs and benefits—is not inevitable; it is contextually driven.  It may resolve some 
debates by reducing unknown risks, but after a point, quantification can only serve to 
further complicate the debate.  Valuation and monetization of extreme intangibles, as we 
see so often in the case of climate change, is not always helpful to a regulatory 
discussion: factors can be “on screen” and have recognized value without bearing an 
explicit price tag.  There are some debates that must be argued without numbers, along 
metrics that cost-benefit analysis does not and cannot speak to, such as distribution, 
justice, and ethics.  These are uncomfortably vague terms, of course, but attaching a 
number to them will make them only more unwieldy, not any more manageable.  Crafting 
an appropriate policy is not simply a matter of demanding more research and collecting 
more information in the hopes of being able to quantify a greater slice of the uncertainty.  
To a point this will serve, but thereafter, the marginal benefit received from the extra 
knowledge is not worth the marginal cost of collecting it. 
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 Decision-makers should carefully consider the role they allow cost-benefit 
analysis to play in their decision-making process.  They should evaluate how successfully 
they believe cost-benefit analysis captures and values complex, intangible costs and 
benefits.  If not very successfully, then the decision-maker should seek some method of 
more comprehensively valuing those features.  For some, this may be a method of 
modified cost-benefit analysis, a “comprehensive” cost-benefit analysis that incorporates 
qualitative as well as strictly quantitative factors into its calculations. 
 Cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle imply differing mindsets on 
rationality and its ability to cope with uncertainty.  It may be tempting to conceptualize 
cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle as contrasting methodologies; 
indeed in their most reductionist, extreme theoretical forms, this may be true.  It will be 
more useful, however, to think of these two approaches as situated not in opposition, but 
towards the ends of a spectrum, a sliding scale of greater to lesser integration of 
precaution. 
 
A Spectrum of Precaution 
 It is important to recognize that cost-benefit analysis is not synonymous with 
quantitative analysis; nor is the precautionary principle synonymous with qualitative 
analysis.  Characteristics of quantitative analysis include: valuation, monetization, 
cardinal comparison and ranking, and the assumption of commensurability.  Qualitative 
analysis is marked by: description, estimation, ordinal comparison and ranking, and the 
assumption of incommensurability.  Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are both 
inevitably influenced by human fallibility and subjectivity.  While cost-benefit analysis 
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may lie closer to the quantitative analysis end of the spectrum and the precautionary 
principle closer to the qualitative, there is still a considerable gray area of overlap 
between the goals of cost-benefit analysis and of the precautionary principle.  The two 
extremes are politically untenable.  A regulation based on cold numerical analysis alone 
would fail to impress citizens who are also concerned with non-utilitarian values such as 
morality; a regulation based on nothing more than the decision-makers’ opinions about 
what is important with no attempt made at numerical justification would be rejected 
because those same citizens also care about the decision’s economic impacts.  But 
decision-makers are more subtle and can walk this fine line.  We can conceive of a kind 
of decision-making for regulating risk that merges quantitative and qualitative analysis: 
less strict, more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that can also exhibit the 
characteristics of qualitative analysis.  Comprehensive cost-benefit analysis may 
describe, estimate, rank ordinally, and acknowledge the incommensurability of certain 
factors.  We would expect most decision-making on climate change regulation to lie 
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, occurring in an environment of comingling 
assessment methodologies, integrating precaution into numerical calculations, 
qualitatively accounting for any remaining, incommensurate anticipated costs and 
benefits, as well as incommensurate, unanticipated, uncertain risk.  The calculation would 
be comprehensive and cautious. 
 What can we call this gray area?  Proponents of cost-benefit analysis might insist 
that it is still cost-benefit analysis, with precaution sprinkled throughout.  Precautionary 
supporters might say that the principal mode of decision-making thought is caution, aided 
along by quantification.  It may even be possible for the same decision-making behavior 
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to be called both cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle in action by 
different theorists in a term turf war. 
 This spectrum from more or less integration of precaution is matched by—is in 
fact generated by—a corresponding sliding scale of faith in human rationality in the 
decision-making process. 
 
A Spectrum of Rationality 
 The active, if tautological, phrase “decision-makers make decisions” is a more 
evocative and accurate conceptualization of the process than the passive “decisions are 
made.”  It serves to indicate that decisions do not make themselves; fallible humans are in 
the driver’s seat, making, even with their best ability, only an attempt at objectivity, and 
having, even with their best intentions, only aspirations towards complete rationality.  
Humans are fallible.  Is fully “rational” decision-making possible? 
 Where along the quantitative-qualitative spectrum of the integration of precaution 
decision-makers choose the locus for their own decision-making depends upon where 
they situate themselves along the spectrum of faith in human rationality.  How we make 
decisions relates back to our confidence in ourselves, in our scientific investigative 
abilities, and in linear, inclusive, rational thought to enable us to make optimal decisions.  
If we believe that we are highly capable of rational decision-making, then we will believe 
more strongly that costs and benefits are commensurable, that they can be valued, 
monetized, and compared.  We will be towards the quantitative end of the spectrum, with 
comparatively less integrated precaution.  If, on the other hand, we believe that our 
rationality is bounded and our decision-making flawed, we will believe more strongly 
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that the world around us is incommensurable, that we should not attempt to rank 
cardinally, but should instead rely on description and ordinal comparison, doing so in a 
cautious way, fully conscious that we are not and cannot be in full possession of the facts, 
and that we do not know all we need to know to make a perfectly optimal decision.  We 
will be towards the qualitative end of the spectrum, with greater integrated precaution. 
 As optimal a decision as we can make—that is, a satisfactory decision—will be 
based on a healthy attitude towards rationality.  The case is clear that we should not 
expect our rationality to be perfect, much as we would like it to.  For anyone to assume 
that he is a perfectly rational man would be hubris.  If we accept human fallibility, there 
are important decision-making implications.  The solution is not to abandon all hope of 
rationality; clearly the tools we have developed are an aid to rational thought.  We can 
assume some but not perfect rationality.  This translates into a decision-making technique 
that integrates a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis, highlighting the 
importance of integrating precaution throughout the decision-making process, including 
into cost-benefit calculations.  Middling faith in human rationality acknowledges the 
inability to rationalize perfectly.  A conscious awareness that we cannot know the full 
consequences of our policy choices is requisite for appropriate decision-making.  
Acknowledge uncertainty and the lack of perfect rationality.  Be well informed, but be 
both cautious about the knowledge acquired and the unknowns that remain.  A decision-
maker who airs, to himself and to constituents, the assumptions made in the scientific 
process and in the social scientific political process, recognizing and owning up to any 
uncertainties, will stand the best chance of achieving a satisfactory policy.  The perfectly 
rational man paradigm is not useful—it is unattainable, and pulls attention excessively 
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towards the quantitative end of the spectrum, away from the middle where decisions may 
be more appropriately made.  It is in the middle of the spectrums of rationality and of 
precaution that we satisfice. 
 In the case of climate change in particular, the magnitude and intricacy of the 
problem would seem to advise that our confidence in our ability to master the complexity 
and reduce uncertainty be correspondingly low.  Our traditional rational decision-making 
models are simply not built to deal with a crisis of this scale.  Consequently, decision-
makers should integrate more precaution into both their cost-benefit analysis and in those 
regions where cost-benefit analysis cannot extend, relying on qualitative or descriptive 
analysis to paint a fuller picture of the policy alternatives and consequences. 
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CHAPTER 5: GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND QUESTIONS 
 The hypothetical question, “What would I do if I were in a position to make these 
decisions?” seems less and less hypothetical all the time.  The hope is that some day it 
will not be hypothetical at all.  This leap from academic theory into practice is exciting, 
but slightly daunting.  What would I in fact do if I were in a position to make these 
decisions?  Also to the point, what do those currently in the position in fact do when they 
make these decisions? 
 What follows is a guide for “reflective practitioners”101
 The goal is not to craft a “perfect” model for policy-making: the preceding 
discussion of rational decision-making would preclude that.  The list is nonetheless 
intended to be a useful compilation of principles and questions derived from the theory, 
all speaking to how a reflective practitioner can best respond to academic theory, 
integrating it in part or in whole into their practice. 
—those who aspire to be 
better decision-makers through consciously reflecting on their thought processes and 
actions.  The intent is to compile a list of normative suggestions for practitioners to be 
better and more effective.  It is aimed primarily at an audience of newcomers to the field 
(it is at least partially intended as a personal document), but it could perhaps also be read 
by long-time practitioners to give them new eyes for looking at familiar situations.  It is a 
tentative plan of action. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101 Thanks to Professor Menefee-Libey for this useful term. 
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Guiding Principles 
 These principles are conclusions distilled from the preceding chapters’ discussion 
and evaluation of theory.  They are normative conclusions, principles which may be 
valuable to a decision-maker in moving forward in cases of uncertainty such as climate 
change.  The caution included at the outset of this project is well remembered here: the 
conclusions reached are proffered suggestions, not dictums, accumulated by a student 
who has only theory, not yet experience, to bolster her claims. 
• Numbers facilitate negotiation, but quantification is not inevitable, and in some 
cases may be extraneous or even deleterious to functional debates about non-
utilitarian values, including justice and ethics. 
• Precaution can be integrated throughout the information-gathering and decision-
making process, not just after a threshold of uncertainty is reached. 
• An individual decision-maker’s level of faith in human rationality will influence 
to what extent they incorporate precaution into their decisions. 
• Decision-makers will make the most socially acceptable decisions when they do 
not rely on humans’ “omniscient rationality” and integrate comprehensive 
calculations and precaution accordingly. 
• Decision-makers can confer with theorists and academics to debate the potential 
for operationalizing normative theory in practice, in order to ground their 
decisions—where intuition may desert them or prove inadequate—in sound 
policy theory. 
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Guiding Questions 
 What cannot be captured in principles may be left best expressed as questions.  
These are thoughts that cannot quite be confidently phrased as guiding principles.  The 
questions take three forms: some questions are unanswered, the possible subject of future 
research and thought, or that may find resolution through situational context and 
experience.  Some are unanswerable, irreducibly complex, but nonetheless worth asking 
repeatedly.  A third type includes questions that a practitioner could ask to understand 
and situate herself in her agency context.  In striving to be a better decision-maker, a 
reflective practitioner might ask: 
• What does it mean to be a “better” decision-maker?  “Better” with respect to 
what? 
• What is the “best” policy?  “Best” with respect to what? 
• How do my personal values and agency culture shape my decision-making, and 
my determination of what a hypothetical optimal policy is? 
• Does my knowledge of theory consciously influence my decisions? 
• Should I endeavor to make practice match normative theories, and if so, which 
ones?  Or is that impractical?  How practical is the theory, and how much heed 
should I pay it?  Do I know enough through experience and intuition to not need 
to rely on theory put forth by academics who have not had real-world exposure to 
the decision-making situations in which practitioners find themselves? 
• Can I develop my intuition into a justifiable metric?  If so, how? 
• In what ways is a theoretical understanding inadequate to comprehend decision-
making in the real world? 
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• To what extent does theory inform decisions made about climate change in the 
agency, and to what extent are the decisions made by intuition? 
• What are my moral and ecosystemic worries and worst-case scenarios?  Can they 
be minimized and avoided?  If so, how? 
• How can I use policy to narrow the gulf between the status quo and my imagined 
future desired world? 
• How can I build personal and agency capacity to cope with uncertainty as 
comprehensively as possible? 
• What are my individual coping strategies?  In what ways do I characteristically 
cope with uncertainty to make a decision?  Are my decisions more or less 
precautionary than those of my peers? 
• How would I characterize the decision-making process in the agency?  Do I feel 
that this decision-making process results in satisfactory decisions?  If not, what 
procedural and substantive obstacles in the decision-making process exist that 
prevent reaching those decisions?  Can these obstacles be minimized or removed?  
In an ideal world, what would my decision-making process be, and what real-
world factors thwart that? 
• Do I consider myself a pragmatist or an idealist?  How does this affect how I 
respond to uncertainty? 
• How do I feel about the compromises that I have to make in view of the 
seriousness and urgency of climate change? 
• Does the process of vetting decisions to the public have the effect of introducing 
more precautionary buffers into calculations? 
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CONCLUSION 
 Public policy is not produced by a single, monolithic entity.  Ultimately, 
individuals facing personal and institutional constraints are responsible for making 
complex decisions employing both quantitative and qualitative, and more or less 
precautious, methods of analysis in a way consistent with their personal and institutional 
faith in the ability of human rationality to conceptualize difficult problems.  Regardless of 
where on the scale of rationality and the corresponding scale of precaution a decision-
maker may be, those parameters which they use in their assessment are “pivotal and have 
important normative implications” for policy creation and implementation.102
 Despite the room for decision-making discretion, even creativity, there is, of 
course, reason to be less than thrilled about the prospect of having to make these high-
stakes policy decisions on climate change.  The realm of public policy in general, and 
perhaps especially so for climate change regulation, is “‘is a world of settled institutions 
designed to allow imperfect people to use flawed procedures to cope with insoluble 
problems.’”
 
103  We could also suppose that “[a] wise policy maker will not even try for 
completion.”104
 
  Nevertheless, the challenge of making the “best” decision is an 
irresistible siren song, and the appeal of the pernicious problem of climate change is 
magnetic.   
 
 
                                                 
102 Christoforou 35 
103 Lindblom 1993 72 
104 Lindblom 1968 14 
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